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THOUGHTS ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS: LOS ANGELES
MEMORIAL COLISEUM COMMISSION V
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
by Lewis S. Kurlantzick*
For the National Football League (NFL), and for other professional sports leagues, the past several years have produced a number of
off-field developments that may dramatically affect the structure of
league governance. One notable development is the antitrust suit
brought by the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission ("the
Coliseum") and the Oakland Raiders ("the Raiders") against the NFL
after the league attempted to block the team's move to Los Angeles.'
At issue in the case is not the financial relationship between players
*Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. 1965, Wesleyan University,
LL.B. 1968, Harvard University. The author wishes to acknowledge, with gratitude, the contributions of Professor Kurt A. Strasser and third-year law student Bart A. Sayet.
1. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 1982),
appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982).
In addition to the antitrust claims, the Raiders alleged a breach of an oral contract to allow
the move, breach of the Commissioner's fiduciary duty to treat each member fairly, and interference with prospective economic advantage. See Granelli, The Antitrust Super Bowl, Nat'i L..,
June 29, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
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and owners-which was implicated in the collective bargaining negotia-

tions between the National Football League Players Association and
the owners' Management Council-but rather, the relationship of the

owners among themselves and to the league. More particularly, the
case brings into question the process by which decisions are made

about the location and relocation of franchises-the control exerted by
the league over team movement and the procedures by which that control is exercised. The Raiders and the Coliseum allege that the present

system of control, which requires approval of a proposed franchise establishment or move by three-quarters of the owners, 2 violates the
Sherman Act. a
This article examines the antitrust questions raised by the Raiders'
suit. It evaluates the present arrangement in light of the peculiar economic character of a professional sports league. While the article focuses principally on professional football, other leagues-such as the
National Hockey League (NHL) and National Basketball Association

(NBA)-exercise similar controls on franchise movement 4 and, there2. N.F.L. CoNsT. & BY-LAws art. III, § 3.1(b) (1970, amefided 1982) provides: "The admission of a new member club, either within or outside the home territory of an existing member
club, shall require the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the
league."
N.F.L. CONST. & BY-LAws art. IV, § 4.3 (1970, amended 1982) provides:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of football games by member
clubs within the home territory of each member. No member club shall have the right to
transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or outside its home
territory, without prior approval by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing
member clubs of the league.
3. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. The NHL, which classifies its constitution and bylaws as confidential documents, requires a
unanimous vote to approve the relocation of a franchise, regardless whether the new site is within
another's home territory. Letter from Gilbert Stein, Vice President/General Counsel, National
Hockey League, to Lewis Kurlantzick (Sept. 21, 1982).
N.B.A. CONS?. § 7 provides in relevant part:
A membership in the Association may be transferred only with the approval of the Board
of Governors, given in its absolute and sole discretion by a vote of three-quarters of all of
its members at a meeting duly warned for such purpose, which approval may be granted
upon such terms and conditions as the Board by such vote shall, in its absolute and solo
discretion, consider appropriate.
N.B.A. CoNs?. § 9 provides in relevant part: "A membership shall not be granted or transferred for operation within the territory of any member without the prior written consent of such
member."
The legality of the NBA scheme was almost subjected to judicial scrutiny. In the spring of
1982, the San Diego Clippers of the NBA indicated a desire to move to Los Angeles. See N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1982, at C7, col. 1. Undoubtedly, the possibility of an antitrust suit was on the
minds of league officials as they decided how to respond, particularly because the Clippers intended to move into the Los Angeles Arena, which is run by the Coliseum. Indeed, the NBA went
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fore, the analysis presented bears directly on the desirability and propriety of their arrangements as well.
I. BACKGROUND
In early 1980, after lengthy and secret negotiations with the Coliseum, Al Davis, the managing general partner of the Raiders, announced that the Raiders would be moving to the Coliseum to fill the
void left by the Los Angeles Rams' move to Anaheim.0 Several lawsuits
ensued in both federal and state courts, some aimed at striking down
obstacles to the move, others aimed at keeping the Raiders in Oakland.' Despite the legal battles, Davis signed a "memorandum of agree-

ment" to move the Raiders to Los Angeles. 7 On March 10, the NFL
owners met and voted 22 to 0, with 5 abstentions, to deny permission
for the Raiders' move.8 Davis stated that he was prepared to make the
move without league approval." The result of the confrontation was the
initiation of an antitrust suit by the Coliseum and the Raiders against
the NFL. 10
The presiding judge in the case analogized the dispute to a domesto court seeking a declaratory judgment as to the legality, under the antitrust laws, of their rules
governing franchise movements. See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at A22, col. 6. The action was
dropped when the Clippers withdrew their request to move. See N.Y. Times, July 2 1982 at A17,
col. 4. See also note 71 infra.
5. Wallace, Raider Move Is Imminent, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, at A17, col. 6.
6. Undoubtedly, the most ingenious response designed to forestall the move was the effort by
the City of Oakland to use its power of eminent domain to condemn the team. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal. 3d 656, modified, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr.
673 (1982)(en bane). In City of Oakland,the Supreme Court of California held that the power of
eminent domain may be used by a city to condemn and acquire an on-going enterprise when it is
necessary to do so to effect a valid public use. The court did not rule on the merits, remanding the
case for determination whether the proposed condemnation was in furtherance of a valid public
use. 32 Cal. 3d at 77, 646 P.2d at 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
The significance of loyal fan support is discussed infra at note 83. Not surprisingly, the interests of fans and communities in the face of what they perceive as abandonment has stirred political concern and has prompted the introduction of congressional legislation designed to discourage
the movement of consistently well-supported teams by immunizing from antitrust challenge the
enforcement of rules requiring approval by the membership of a league for any relocation of a
member club.
7. See Granelli, supra note 1, at 1, col. 2.
8. Davis neither initiated nor attended this meeting and vote. He claimed that the approval
process was illegal and the permission of the owners was unnecessary.
9. See Wallace, N.F.L, in 22 to 0 Vote, Refuses to Allow Raiders to Move. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 11, 1980, at B17, col. 4.
10. The Coliseum first brought its antitrust action against the NFL in September 1978 after
the Los Angeles Rams announced their plans to move to Anaheim. The Raiders instituted their
action in 1980. The two actions were consolidated for trial. See Granelli, supra note I, at 1,col. 2.
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tic quarrel and urged the parties to settle their differences out of
court.11 But no settlement was negotiated and, after several delays, the
trial began in May 1981. When the jury, after thirteen days of deliberation, was unable to agree on a verdict, the judge declared a mistrial. 12
A new trial began in March 1982, and, in early May, the jury issued a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, pronouncing the NFL rules on
franchise movement a violation of the Sherman Act. a The judge issued
an injunction barring the league from enforcing its rule and permitting
the Raiders to move to Los Angeles. 4 A motion to stay the injunction
while the league appealed was denied,"5 and the case is presently on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."
II.

THE PROBLEM

What exactly is the Coliseum's and the Riiders' claim? They
challenge the legality of two interconnected sets of league provisions
that govern teams' territorial rights and franchise movements. First,
the NFL Constitution and By-Laws, with certain insignificant exceptions, give each franchise the exclusive right to "exhibit" league games
within a seventy-five-mile radius of its home city.1 7 No team can play
games within the home territory of any other team unless the home
club is a participant.1 8 And no franchise can be granted in an area that
overlaps the home territory of an existing club without the affirmative
vote of three-fourths of the members of the league." Second, no member may transfer its franchise to a different city without prior league
approval. Approval of any transfer-whether or not to a location within
the home territory of another club--requires an affirmative vote of
11. Prior to the trial, Commissioner Rozelle and Al Davis met with Judge Harry Prcgerson,
who retained trial jurisdiction after being elevated from the district court to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, for five and one-half hours in an unsuccessful effort to settle out of court.
See Rogers, Raiders and N.F.L. Urged to Avoid Trial, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at D22, col. 3;
id., Jan. 14, 1981, at A21, col. 1.
12. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1981, at A15, col. 1.
13. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 1982).
See N.Y. Times, May 8, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
14. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. June 14,
1982). See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at D26, col. 5.
15. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. June 14,
1982).
16. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 1982),
appeal docketed, No. 82-5572 (9th Cir. June 14, 1982).
17. N.F.L. CONST. & BY-LAws art. IV, § 4.1.
18. N.F.L. CONST. & By-LAws art. IV, § 4.2(c) (1970, amended 1982).
19. N.F.L. CONST. & BY-LAwS art. III, § 3.1(b) (1970, amended 1982).
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three-fourths of the members of the league.20 The rules contain no criteria or standards for making the decision of approval or disapproval.
At stake, then, are two fundamental elements of the NFL structure:
the allocation of territories and the regulation of franchise movement.
While it is not unusual for players to initiate antitrust suits,21 it is
most unusual for league members-who have much more invested in
the system-to launch an attack on the basic principles by which the
league is organized and run. Yet this is exactly what the Raiders' suit
does. And not surprisingly, the action marks the first time that an antitrust suit has been brought by an NFL member against the league.
The NBA, however, faced a similar challenge in 1977 when the
New York Knickerbockers threatened to block the then New York
Nets' move to northern New Jersey.22 Because NBA rules require the
consent of the team into whose territory a move is to be made,2" the
Knicks, whose home territory included much of New Jersey, claimed
that the move could not be made without their approval. In response,
Roy Bee, the owner of the Nets, initiated an action against the Knicks,
producing near hysteria among other NBA owners. 24 The most ominous aspect of the lawsuit was that it questioned the legality of territorial rights in professional sports under the Sherman Act. Not unexpectedly, Lawrence O'Brien, the NBA Commissioner, issued a statement
claiming that territorial exclusivity is indispensable to the operation of
20.

N.F.L. CoNsT. &'BY-LAws art. IV, § 4.3 (1970, amended 1982). When the Coliseum

filed the initial suit against the NFL, the league's constitution and bylaws required unanimous
approval for the location or transfer of a team. See notes 69-78 Infra and accompanying text for
discussion of the old rule.
21. For example, rules in various professional sports governing player eligibility and the draft,
as well as those limiting player movement through reserve and option arrangements, have been
challenged. See. e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 US. 258 (1972); Haywood v. NBA, 401 US. 1204
(1971); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), aj-d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afd. 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. An additional challenge nearly developed when Peter Gilbert, owner of the NHL's Colorado Rockies, applied for permission in Feburary of 1982 to move his team to northern New
Jersey. He indicated that he would consider bringing an antitrust action against the league if it
refused permission. See Delano, Denver's Hockey FranchiseIs on the Rocks, N.Y. Post, Jan. 29,
1982, at 78, col. 1; N.Y. Post, Feb. 9, 1982, at 65, col. 2.
23. N.BA. CoNsT. § 9.
24. Goldaper, Nets, Seeking to Move to Jersey, Sue KnIcks Over Effort to Block It. N.Y.

Times, July 7, 1977, at Al, col. 2. The Nets entered the NBA in 1976 and were permitted to play
in Nassau County, which is also within the Knicks' territory, only after agreeing to pay the Knicks
an indemnity payment of $4 million. The Nets charged that the indemnity agreement was in
violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
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professional sports leagues.2 5 And the other owners urged the Nets to
drop the antitrust portion of its suit. 28 Because the dispute was ultimately settled
out of court, the antitrust questions were never
27
litigated.
The NFL owners and officials, like their counterparts in the NBA,
are understandably concerned about a lawsuit challenging the league
rules that govern territorial allotment. Horizontal territorial divisions-those between economic entities at the same level of the market
structure-are viewed with disapproval under the antitrust laws.2 8 Consider, for example, two supermarket chains that divide an area into two
territories, thereby eliminating competition between the two in the regions where each has exclusive sway. Each company would be free to
make price, quality, and other marketing decisions without considering
possible actions of the other.29 The incentive to provide quality goods at
the lowest possible price would be lessened. Further economic "inefficiencies" would result if consumer demand in either subarea were
greater than one company chose to supply because the arrangement
prevents the movement of resources to meet that demand. 30 Such arrangements would, with good reason, be condemned as clear antitrust
violations.31
25. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1977, at All, col. 4.
26. See Goldaper, N.B.A. Owners Will Meet on Nets'Suit, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1977, at At 1,
col. 1.
27. Goldaper, Nets Will Move to New Jersey-For$4 Million, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1977, at
Al, col. i. The agreement included an additional $4 million indemnity fee to be paid by the Nets
to the Knicks. Id.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. BI.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
29. In making these decisions, neither would have to worry about the possibility of the other
coming into its area and selling the same or similar product more cheaply. It is worth noting that
when the San Diego Clippers announced their intention to move to Los Angeles, they indicated
that their ticket prices would be lower than those of the Los Angeles Lakers. See N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1982, at D22, col. 6.
30. In addition to the price gouging that is permitted by the removal of competition through
territorial rights, the impact of the practice on resource allocation, though difficult to quantify,
may be significant. If a sports team is the only seller of the game in its area and the total supply is
controlled by the league, "the supply of the services of professional sports clubs will be less than
that required for efficient allocation of resources." H. DEMMERT, THE EcONOMICS OF PROFsSIONAL TEAM SPORTs 80 (1973).
31. In the language of antitrust law, such clear transgressions are termed "per so" violations.
Per se violations are agreements or practices that "because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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Football teams sell entertainment, and agreements not to sell too
near the sales place of other football teams appear, at least initially, to
fall squarely within the same prohibition. The demand for football may
be so great in a particular area that the team can raise prices well
above the level needed for it to continue to operate profitably. In the
absence of geographical restrictions, the potential of another team moving into the area can operate as a constraint on the existing team's
price decisions. Geographical divisions and transfer restrictions, though,
remove this constraint. Indeed, the NFL's procedures for awarding
franchises control the total supply of the product, while its territorial
and transfer
provisions make each team a monopolist in its own market
32
area.
A closer look at professional football, however, reveals that its restrictions are not strictly analogous to horizontal divisions between
competing businesses.33 Professional football can accurately claim that
it is significantly different from other, more typical, industries, such as
supermarkets. Professional sports do not fit neatly into traditional models of industrial structure, and they have had some success in obtaining
judicial recognition of their distinctive economic character. NFL teams
are a hybrid form of economic animal-both business rivals and partners. Unlike other industries, the success of each member of the professional football industry depends, to a considerable extent, upon the success of all other members. When a new franchise is created, or when a
club moves to a new area, its value is, in part, due to the investment
already made in other teams. Established teams effectively invest in a
new entrant. It takes several years for an expansion team, for example,
to become competitive and attract fans. During this start-up period,
established teams are likely to experience below-average attendance
when playing the expansion team.
While the supermarket owner stands to gain from, and therefore is
32. It is true that potential competition from another league is always a possibility, but establishment of another league requires the commitment of large amounts of capital to a very risky
venture.
33. Some of professional football's restrictions might be viewed as vertical divisions of the
market. Vertical territorial limitations, restrictive agreements between manufacturers and dealers
or distributors, are not per se violations of antitrust law. See, e.g.. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The
legality of these arrangements is determined through a particularized inquiry into their justification and effect. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
One of the fascinating and perplexing aspects of a sports league is that the relationships do
not fit neatly into either the vertical or horizontal category. League territorial and transfer rcstrictions possess features of both vertical and horizontal market divisions.
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not troubled by, his competitors' folding, in a sports league, the failure
of several franchises could jeopardize the other teams and, perhaps, the
entire league. Accordingly, it is not surprising that professional sports
leagues will step in to support a failing team until new ownership can
be found for the floundering franchise.
This "bail-out" practice highlights the differences between the operation of professional leagues and other enterprises. Teams must have
someone to play. And while every team plays to win each game, each
organization knows that it is in its self-interest for all teams to remain
financially viable and highly competitive on the field. Sustained incompetence by a number of teams presumably would also lead to lowered
television revenues-a loss incurred by all teams because broadcast revenues are distributed equally among league members.34 This collective
interest in the maintenance of on-field competitive balance may be reflected in some restrictions on player movement and some limits on the
"battle of the treasuries" as well.3 NFL teams, in addition, have a
joint interest in the promotion of professional football over other sports
and other forms of entertainment. An added function of the league,
therefore, is to act like a trade association that markets the product of
its constituent members.3
It is this economic and athletic interdependence among teams that,
in part, explains Commissioner Pete Rozelle's characterization of the
NFL as a "partnership. '37 But Rozelle's use of the partnership label is
also calculated to defend league restrictions on team location. Section
one of the Sherman Act applies only to a "contract, combination," or
"conspiracy" in restraint of trade. 38 By viewing itself as a single economic entity,39 such as a partnership, the league asserts that its inter34.

See note 63 infra.

35. While this interest is offered as a justification for these kinds of restrictions, it is not at all
clear, based on limited experience to date, that liberalization or removal of such restrictions would
lead to a permanent imbalance among league members.
36. Indeed, this promotional perspective-with the interests of organized football as an "interbrand" competitor as a touchstone-may provide a helpful framework for assessing the legality of
various practices. Thus, the greater the extent to which a practice can be tied to a joint interest in
promotion, the less vulnerable it should be to antitrust attack. See text accompanying notes 60-62
infra.
37. The Commissioner characterized the NFL as a partnership in his testimony before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee in December 1981. Testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of
the NationalFootballLeague, Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the

House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., unofficial transcript at 2 (Dec,

10,

1981)(provided by National Football League). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1981, at 84, col. 3.
38. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

39. During the first trial of the Raiders' and Coliseum's action, cross-motions were filed seek-
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nal rules are not subject to antitrust scrutiny because an agreement
between at least two independent enterprises is necessary to violate section one. The NFL rules, the league argues, are similar to arrangements between different departments of a corporation or between a corporation and one of its subsidiaries.4 0
But the operation of NFL franchises is not totally interdependent.
Each member team is independently incorporated, maintains separate
balance sheets, and, unlike a partnership, does not share its losses with
other members. Moreover, the set of formal interfranchise agreements
constituting the NFL Constitution and By-Laws could be deemed the
necessary contract that would trigger examination under the antitrust
laws. The partnership label, then, while somewhat illuminating, is also
potentially misleading.4"
Commissioner Rozelle has nonetheless persisted in arguing that
the NFL should be viewed as a form of partnership that produces entertainment. The Commissioner testified before a House Subcommittee
in 1981, seeking legislation that would recognize the novel form of single business enterprise that the NFL represents. 2 He contended that
the courts have failed to recognize the unique nature of the league and,
consequently, have provided only minimal guidance for determining
what league behavior is legal and what is not. More specifically, he
requested a congressional statement that a sports league should be regarded as a single enterprise for purposes of examining certain of its
43
activities under the antitrust laws.
ing a directed verdict with respect to the NFL's contention that it is a single economic enterprise
for purposes of the suit. Judge Pregerson ruled that the NFL's member teams should be regarded
as separate business enterprises for purposes of § I of the Sherman Act. Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 1981). See National Football
League Isn't Single Entity, District Court Rules. [July-Dec.] A

MTRusT

& TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 1028, at A-21 (Aug. 20, 1981).
40. Despite Rozelle's insistence that he is not after a wide-ranging exemption, acceptance of
this line of argument would seem to result in a blanket immunity for the league and its members.
41. Should the NFL be recognized as a form of partnership, will the relationships between
teams be governed by analogy to partnership law? For example, partners owe each other a high
duty of care and loyalty. Did the league's decision to prevent the move of the Raiders violate a
duty owed to Al Davis? Alternatively, did Davis violate a fiduciary duty owed to the other owners
when he decided to move the Raiders to Los Angeles? The partnership label invites speculation
about the answers to these and similar questions.
42. Testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of the National Football League. Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 10, 1981)(unofficial transcript provided by National Football League).
43. Testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissionerof the National Football League. Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., unofficial transcript at 21 (Dec. 10, 1981)(provided by National Football
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Although Commissioner Rozelle insisted in his testimony that he
does not seek a sweeping exemption, it is not clear which of the
league's activities are to benefit from the congressional "clarification."
He apparently is most interested in preventing the use of the antitrust
laws by league members to attack the internal structure and operating
principles of the league. The Raiders' lawsuit presumably would fall
into this category. 44 But Congress is not likely to grant any broad immunity from the antitrust laws. 4 6 Instead, of course, it could specifically exempt the territorial and transfer restrictions from antitrust
scrutiny as it has done with other practices, such as the NFL's package
sale of television rights.4 And, in fact, a bill to legitimize professional
league restrictions on relocation was recently introduced in the House
of Representatives.47

The courts have already demonstrated some awareness, however,
of the peculiar economic character of professional sports.' 8 Courts have
League). Pointing to inconsistencies in judicial decisions, Commissioner Rozelle argued that professional sports leagues are "in a Catch-22 situation-where the individual clubs are regarded as
separate, independent entrepreneurs outside the plane of league decisionmaking, while all of the
league's other members remain obligated to conduct all of their operations on whatever conditions
are established by the individual club." Id. at 7-8. See also House Panel Hears Call to Treat
Sports League as Single Entity, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1044,
at A-21 (Dec. 17, 1981).
44. The Professional Sports Stabilization Act of 1982, H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REc. H2598 (daily ed. May 21, 1982), which has the support of the NFL, provides that it
shall not be illegal under the antitrust laws for a league and its members "to enforce rules requiring approval by the membership of the league for any relocation of a member club of such
league." Id. at § 2(l)(a).
45. Nor would the declaration sought be desirable. It is most likely and appropriate that Congress and the courts will view leagues as single entities for some purposes and not for others.
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
47. The Professional Sports Stabilization Act of 1982, H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. H2598 (daily ed. May 21, 1982), was introduced in May of 1982 by Congressman
Peter Stark, who represents the Bay area. The bill authorizes sports leagues to operate with rules
requiring their member teams to obtain approval of the league membership before moving, If a
league rejects a transfer proposal, it cannot be sued under the antitrust laws for maintaining the
existing club location. Id. at § 2(l)(a).
Congressman Stark had introduced a similar bill in January 1981 to provide certain disincentives to relocation of professional sports teams. Sports Franchise Relocation Act, H.R. 823, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This bill was broader in scope than the one offered in 1982. It attempted
to legislate standards for the relocation of teams and to establish a regulatory framework for the
evaluation of proposed relocations.
48. The courts have recognized the unique nature and purpose of sports league activities and
have held that the per se rule is inappropriate for evaluating sports league activities. See, e.g.,
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271,
273-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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sought to accommodate the Sherman Act's hostility to restraints on
free competition with the practical necessity of allowing some joint action to achieve balanced, sustained, and geographically dispersed athletic activity."9 When examining restrictive practices, courts have considered proffered justifications-such as the interest in preserving the
financial integrity of each team and the league-that would not even
be entertained in suits involving other industries.50
But courts cannot end the inquiry by recognizing that teams in one
sense are joint venturers. That recognition constitutes only the beginning of the analysis. For while it is unwise to apply antitrust law
mechanically to professional sports, any deviation from normal application must be carefully considered and narrowly drawn. Although there
may be a league and public interest in preserving the financial viability
of a professional league, for example, that interest is not served by enabling team owners to achieve excess profits.
Indeed, the public interest arguably would be better served by
strictly applying antitrust law to league rules like the one challenged by
the Raiders. There is theoretical support for the argument that the removal of territorial and transfer restrictions, combined with greater
ease of entry, will lead in the long run to increased equality of financial
strength among teams. Financial equality then, in theory, will allot to
the teams comparable amounts for investment in players, which will
lead to parity in performance levels among the teams. The creation of
competitive balance will, in turn, increase fan enjoyment because uncertainty of outcome heightens the pleasure derived from viewing
sports events and more fans will be associated with a potential winning
team."
In sum, the question whether the NFL's restrictions are undesirable under the antitrust laws is a complicated one. Recognition of the
distinctive nature of a sports league makes the issue of antitrust legal49. The NFL has an interest in creating fan interest throughout the country. This dispersion is
attractive to television producers and accounts, in part, for the NFL's huge contracts with the
television networks. The league also has an interest in promoting national identification with the
game-in having it seen as an "American" game. Such a view helps keep the national press and
media interested in the game. This aspect of promotion is not insignificant. The failure of hockey
to succeed in cities like Atlanta and the NHL's inability to obtain a network contract both reflect.
in part, a lack of national identification with the game.
50. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
51. Fan enjoyment appears to be increased through vicarious association with a potentially
winning team, and there are, by definition, more potential winners in a close rac. For a more
thorough discussion of the competitive model applied to professional sports, see H. DsiiIERT,
supra note 30, at 81-88.

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:183

ity difficult because the NFL arrangements emerge as neither obviously
legal nor obviously illegal. Judging the legality of a restriction involves
difficult considerations of the league's peculiar economic character and
the impact of its practices on the public.
III.

EVALUATING A LEAGUE PRACTICE

Evaluation of a league practice requires a particularized analysis
of the purported benefits of the practice and its probable anticompetitive effects to determine if, on balance, the practice is a "reasonable"
one. Thus, the business justifications for the restraints and their competitive implications must be examined in order to decide whether these
justifications are substantial enough to outweigh the possible decrease
in competition. 2 Admittedly, a balancing test of this sort requires
courts to make a number of relatively imprecise determinations and,
consequently, some degree of unpredictability about the antitrust status
of some arrangements is unavoidable. Commissioner Rozelle has noted
this lack of certainty and has strongly criticized the approach because
it offers so little guidance to NFL decisionmakers5 3 It is questionable,
52 In the language of antitrust law, this method of evaluation is termed the "rule of reason."
The Supreme Court, recognizing that literal application of the Sherman Act would outlaw all
contracts or combinations that restrain trade, read the rule of reason into the Act. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). A number of federal courts have found the rule of
reason to be the applicable rule for evaluating sports league restraints. See note 48 supra. In the
first antitrust suit brought by the Coliseum against the league, the federal district court dismissed
the case with leave to amend because the Coliseum did not allege standing to bring the action,
The court then held that the rule of reason was the applicable rule for evaluating §§ 3.1(b) and
4.3 of the N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws. The court explained that
Sections 3.1 and 4.3, the very sections challenged here, appear, on their face, to promote
competition to some degree. The reason for this observation is as follows: In order for
professional games to be played (and thus for economic competition to exist), the teams
must not only agree on how the games are to be played, by adopting playing rules, and
who the participating teams are to be, by adopting playing schedules, but also must agree
on where the games are to be played. Games, traditionally, are played where one of the
participating teams has its home city. Therefore, an agreement on where the games are
to be played necessarily involves an agreement on the location of each team's home city.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F. Supp. 154, 166 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
53. Testimony of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of the National Football League, Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., unofficial transcript at 14-20 (Dec. 10, 1981)(provided by National Football
League). In his testimony, Rozelle claimed that the law regarding application of antitrust law to
sports leagues is confused and unsettled. Id. at 1. Moreover, he asserted, the rule of reason has not
proved flexible enough to accommodate leagues' special requirements. Id. at 4. As indicated in the
text, there is some foundation for Rozelle's concern. Rozelle also stated that, in the absence of
some congressional exemption, the unpredictability of antitrust law as applied to sports
leagues-and presumably the decision in the Raiders' suit-makes it impossible for the NFL to
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however, whether the antitrust laws provide significantly less guidance
to the NFL than to other enterprises." And it is perhaps possible to
better articulate the factors that should govern the determination of the
reasonableness of practices in the context of professional sports.
Given that league members will claim that every restriction is absolutely requisite, the key determination is which practices are essential
to the successful operation of the league. More specifically, the touchstone should be whether the restrictions are reasonably necessary to
accomplish a legitimate objective and, in the jargon of antitrust law,
whether less restrictive alternatives exist. A less restrictive alternative
is an arrangement that will serve the desired objectives with less anticompetitive impact. 55 In thinking about this question, attention must
be paid not only to the reasonableness of outcomes of league decisions,
but also to the process and procedures by which these decisions are
made.
A prime reference point throughout should be the necessity of the
practice for the functioning of a league. Is the practice essential for
organized competition? The definition of a legitimate objective, in this
context, should distinguish between restrictions designed to protect the
interests of the league as a whole, including its long-range promotion of
the game, and those that appear primarily rooted in the profit maximization interests of the individual owners.5 6 The league has a legitimate interest, for example, in regulating the length of the schedule, the
number of players kept on a roster, and the dimensions of the field.
Similarly, prohibitions on betting by players are necessary to protect
the integrity of the game. Concerted control over ticket pricing, however, is not essential for the proper functioning of the game. Therefore,
restrictions such as agreements on the price of tickets should be
condemned.
The question becomes, then, whether the NFL's territorial and
award expansion franchises. Id. at 8.
54. A number of questions that might be worth pursuing suggest themselves. Are the NFL
and other leagues given less guidance with respect to antitrust application than other businesses?
Are there more frequent conflicting decisions among the federal courts where sports leagues are
involved? Do conflicts cause relatively more damage here?
55. Thus, a concern for financial stability might justify practices designed to insure that a
move by one team into the home territory of another will not produce two weak, and possibly
nonviable, franchises. This concern, however, would not justify price-fixing arrangements.
56. This approach suggests, at least for some purposes, a conception of the owners as distinct
from the league itself. This conception is not unique. Trade associations can digest data and send
that information to their members in situations where industry members cannot, by themselves,
collect nondigested data.
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transfer restrictions are more analogous to ticket pricing agreements or
to housekeeping regulations. In short, do the restrictions constitute a
carefully circumscribed means to effectuate a legitimate league objective? The answer appears to be "no."
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE

NFL's

RESTRAINTS

Understandably, the NFL attaches a high priority to the continuity and stability of its franchises. Some restriction on franchise
movement, perhaps only a requirement of adequate advance notice of
intention to move, is necessary for scheduling and administrative planning purposes. More centrally, though, the existence of financial stability among league members is a desirable long-term value. Instability in
the long run results in higher costs, which probably means fewer benefits, such as lower ticket prices, for football consumers. Lower costs
should translate to lower prices, even if the seller is a monopolist. Because unsuccessful franchises erode public interest in the league as a
whole, both financial and public confidence considerations support limiting relocation and entry to teams that have good prospects for longterm success. Failing franchises are a drain on all teams in the league.
Ideally, professional football seeks long-term tenure by competitive
teams in major markets-those population centers that can provide the
critical mass of fan support required for long-run financial viability.
These population areas also supply much of the television and radio
audience that supports professional football. The development of both
fan loyalty and traditional rivalries is threatened by team turnover. If
fans know that their team can move anytime it wishes, they very likely
will be less enthusiastic in their support. This prospect is of particular
concern for a new franchise; it is difficult to generate initial support if
prospective fans know that as soon as the team improves, it may choose
to move. Thus, although at any given time one or more teams may be
interested in moving, there is a continuing collective interest in mutual
restraint.
For related reasons, sports leagues may be concerned about the
impact of relocations on the financing arrangements in stadium leases.
It is common practice for public agencies to finance the construction of
sports stadia. If a team moves or fails, taxpayers are left supporting a
limited-use facility that may be incapable of generating other revenues.
Avoidance of resentment and ill will, at a minimum, therefore, counsels
limitations on transfer and entry.
Territorial rights and transfer restrictions can contribute to the
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achievement of financial stability. The extent of market power bestowed on a given team by these rights depends on several factors, including the existence and quality of other professional sports teams in
the area and the availability of alternative forms of entertainment. Unquestionably, however, territorial rights provide significant protection
from competition-protection that may be necessary to encourage the
requisite investment in professional teams. Investment in a football
team involves a large capital commitment to an uncertain venture that
is likely to suffer start-up losses. Without some measure of territorial
exclusivity, the costs and risks of entry might be prohibitive.
Moreover, territorial exclusivity is not unique to professional
sports. There are analogues in other industries. Consider the producer
of brand A televisions, for example, who grants certain retailers exclusive selling rights in a particular geographical area on the premise that
such a grant is necessary to provide incentive for investment in market
development and promotion. This "vertical" restriction, on balance,
may be beneficial to competition. Although it may reduce intrabrand
competition--competition in the sale of brand A-it may also increase
interbrand competition by making brand A a more effective competitor
with brand B. Recognizing the possible beneficial effects on competition, the Supreme Court has held that such arrangements do not automatically constitute antitrust violations.58 In judging the legality of
these arrangements, a court must consider, among other factors, the
newness of the product, the need for the restriction to induce distributors to enter the field, the extent of restriction on intrabrand competition, and the extent to which interbrand competition will be
stimulated. 9
The manufacturer's purpose in assigning areas to dealers to encourage aggressive promotion or good warranty service is to become a
better interbrand competitor. 60 The social cost, of course, is insulation
57. See note 33 supra.Such arrangements between manufacturers and distributors are termed
"vertical" in the language of antitrust in contrast with "horizontal" arrangements-thosc between
economic entities at the same level of market structure. While these categories are often helpful,
analysis of professional sports supports the notion that sometimes the categories are simply descriptive of the outcome rather than analytical tools used to reach the outcome.
58. See. e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 47-59 (1977); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963). Vertical divisions of markets are evaluated with the rule of reason.

59. See Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-56 (1977).
60. The manufacturer's interest in vertical arrangements is one of higher collective revenues.
But the franchise arrangement may antagonize some dealers when it requires them to act for the
benefit of all franchises rather than in their own self-interest. By analogy, preventing a mowe by
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from intrabrand competition at the retail level. Similarly, a sports
league may want to provide incentives for its franchises to promote
football in favor of competing entertainment events and establish a local identity for the team. A professional football team, like any other
retailer, is more likely to expend energy and resources on promotion if
it is confident that it will reap the benefits. The presence of many
teams, or many retailers, in the same geographical area will discourage
promotional expenditures.
While any loss of competition should provoke concern, the loss in
intrabrand competition caused by vertical restrictions is thus of less
concern if there is significant interbrand competition. If there are not
good substitutes for the product, however, there cannot be effective interbrand competition. The question is, then, are there close substitutes
for professional football? If there are, there is less reason to be concerned about the market power of the NFL and restraints within the
league. The existence of another professional football league, with
teams in NFL cities, would provide a close substitute for the NFL's
product. Absent another football league, alternative forms of athletic
and entertainment events provide the most likely substitutes for
football.61
The concept of interbrand competition provides an additional
touchstone in assessing the antitrust status of various practices. If there
are effective substitutes for football, then the NFL could be deemed to
have a legitimate interest in bettering its position as an interbrand
competitor.6 2 To the extent that its territorial restrictions are attributathe Raiders to Los Angeles because the move might result in lower overall broadcast revenues for
the league, due to the decrease in geographical dispersion, may appear "unfair" to the Raiders.
But antitrust law cannot define or respond well to this unfairness. And, if it tries to respond, it
may make matters worse. The concern of the antitrust laws is the preservation of the competitive
process rather than protection of a particular competitor. Of course, whether a move would decrease overall revenues is an empirical question, and such an impact seems doubtful. Moreover,
geographical dispersion can be achieved without forcing the Raiders to stay in Oakland. See note
72 infra.

61. The degree to which the newly formed United States Football League will provide a substitute for the NFL's product may be minimized by the fact that the two leagues' seasons will not
coincide. One index of the existence of close substitutes would be the reaction of football ticket
buyers to an increase in ticket prices. If large numbers of buyers responded by purchasing other
forms of entertainment, then their reaction would indicate that close substitutes are available.
Such consumer behavior might indicate that football should be viewed as only a part of the larger
market for entertainment events.
62. Thus, the desire to have franchises survive and prosper financially supports an insistence
on suitable facilities, tactics aimed at promotion of the game and the team, the reasonableness of
considering demographics in determining probable fan support, and the pursuit of television con-
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ble to that goal, the anticompetitive impact of the restraints may be

acceptable. The NFL is more likely to become an effective national
interbrand competitor if it disperses successful teams throughout those
areas that can support franchises.

Strategic placement of franchises can generate nationwide public
interest-also an important factor in obtaining lucrative network television contracts, the proceeds of which are shared among all NFL
teams.6 3 Indeed, any analysis of the NFL structure must include consideration of the central role played by broadcasting in providing revenues to teams and football viewing to fans. One of the problems with
territorial and transfer restrictions, as noted, is that they provide economic power that may be used to reduce consumers' choices. However,

to the extent that television provides extensive access to football, this
monopoly concern is reduced."
tracts. Similarly, nationwide exposure to promote football serves interbrand concerns. The objective of geographical dispersion and the service of servable markets, television contracts-both as a
result of promotion and as a form of promotion-and "good-of-the-game" restrictions on the behavior of players and coaches can be seen as rooted in interbrand competition.
63. An analysis of the NFL must include a consideration of the role played by broadcasting
contracts in providing revenues for teams. Local radio revenues are given exclusively to the team
authorizing the broadcasts. But network television revenues are split evenly among all the teams.
The NFL operates with a limited antitrust exemption that permits it to sell television rights as a
package and divide the proceeds equally. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
In 1980, each team received approximately $6million from the league's television contracts.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1981, at A18, col. 1. In 1981, though total revenue varied among teams
according to gate and radio income, the average team received 47% of its revenue from gate
receipts and 42% from broadcast contracts. Moreover, the percentage of income received from
broadcast contracts in the future will increase dramatically under the latest network contract. The
NFL agreed to a five-year contract with the major networks for approximately S2 billion. This
contract will allot to each team about $14.2 million per year. See Eskenazi, The State of the
N.F.L- It's Still Winning More Than It Loses, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1982, at AI,col. 1;Eskenazi,
N.F.L. TV Pact $2 Billion, id., Mar. 23, 1982, at D23, col. 6. In no other sport is so large a
percentage of the revenue paid by television networks. And cable television could eventually provide an additional substantial source of revenue.
64. It might be objected here that watching a telecast is not a close substitute for being there.
This objection appears plausible. But there are undoubtedly fans who are content with a telecast,
and the NFL and other sports leagues have expressed concern that the availability of telecasts will
affect game attendance.
One sports writer probably articulated the sentiment of at least some football fans when he
wrote:
Let's face it, with due and true apologies to the Oakland fans who stalwartly supported the Raiders through the better half of two decades, the average NFL bum-like
me-just wants to be sure that when he calls the candy store on Sunday morning, there's
going to be a game there when he clicks on the tube Sunday afternoon.
The rest is superfluous. LA Raiders, Oakland Raiders, Sheboygan Raiders. Who
cares.

Drury, Davis-Rozelle Battles Take Toll on the Mind, N.Y. Post, June 25, 1981, at 99, col. 3.
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Because television contracts provide a large percentage of each
team's revenues, and because broadcasting creates and serves a nationwide audience for games, there may be little need for a rule protecting
teams from territorial "invasions." Television revenues lessen the economic incentive for a team-whether an existing one or new one-to
invade another territory and minimize the economic consequences for
teams whose territory is invaded. Subject to the caveat that television
revenues in part reflect local fan identification with local teams, the
importance of team location may be sharply limited by the role of
television.
Even assuming, however, that the NFL has a legitimate interest in
regulating the location of its teams in pursuit of the goal of stability
and that the increasing importance of television contracts does not vitiate that interest, the question remains whether the present restrictions
are reasonable and necessary. There is no reason to assume that, without these restrictions, teams would casually ericroach upon the territory
of an existing team. The existing team may be well established and
enjoying the benefit of accumulated fan support and goodwill. Capital
The NFL and several other professional leagues expressed concern about the effect of telecasts when they objected to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order that repealed
cable television rules on distant signal carriage. The leagues argued that cable TV, by making
available game broadcasts from distant cities when a team is playing at home, would reduce gate
receipts, threaten the league concept by damaging weaker franchises, and eventually result in less
sports programming. In ruling that the FCC conclusion that sports programming requires no special protection after the repeal of the distant signal rules was not arbitrary, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit noted that "the leagues did not produce any evidence that the number of
sports broadcasts by home clubs has been reduced in the existing areas of high cable penetration,
or would be reduced in the future" and that numerous variables, other than the availability of
sports programming on television, influence gate receipts. Malrite TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140,
1150 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982).
The question of the effect on game attendance of the same game or another game being
televised that day is ultimately an empirical one on which studies need to be done. Relevant
information would include figures on "no-shows"-people who purchase tickets but do not attend
the game-when there is a sellout. Researchers would have to control statistically for factors such
as weather. Other variables would have to be considered-such as the situation where two mediocre teams play locally and a game between two powerful teams is televised the same day. If, in
fact, television were a substitute for live viewing, and if fans were to opt for telecasts over attending, there would seem to be no economic or social reason to interfere with their preference.
However, one study concluded that the lifting of local television blackouts did not have an
effect on the number of no-shows. The authors analyzed the effect of the lifting of television
blackouts on the number of no-shows during the 1973 through 1977 NFL seasons. They concluded
that, while the weather and the quality of the home team did influence the decision to attend, the
lifting of blackouts had no influence on the number of no-shows. See Siegfried & Hinshaw, The
Effect of Lifting Television Blackouts on ProfessionalFootball No-Shows, 32 J. ECON. & BUs. I,
10-11 (1979).
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costs and the prospect of competing against an entrenched franchise
make entry difficult and risky, whether for an existing team considering
relocation or for an expansion franchise. These risks constitute a particularly effective deterrent when the team is profitable in its present location and has strong fan support.65 These are factors that Al Davis must
have considered before deciding that the Raiders could be more profitable in Los Angeles. And, antitrust policy is premised on the view that
such entrepreneurial judgments are best left to the individual
businessman.
The history of baseball franchise location and movement illustrates
the importance of economic disincentives and incentives in regulating
team placement. The record of two-team cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and St. Louis suggests that economic considerations, rather
than league territorial rules, are the main deterrent to multiteam cities
and that economic disincentives are usually sufficient to discourage relocation in saturated markets.68 Conversely, the creation of the multiclub metropolitan areas of San Diego-Anaheim-Los Angeles and San
Francisco-Oakland is evidence that the rules do not preclude
entry
617
when the economic incentives to enter are sufficiently strong.
There may be circumstances in which a league justifiably wishes
to have available some mechanism for control over team movement. An
owner whose team is losing money, for example, may be reckless in his
choice of a new location. Prevention of ill-planned moves would protect
the long-term interests of the league and its members. But it is also
possible that the exclusionary power will be invoked simply to maximize the monopolistic profits of existing franchises. And, in determining the "reasonableness" of a particular restrictive practice, courts have
looked unfavorably on overbroad restraints, particularly where there
are no appropriate procedural safeguards against arbitrary
application. 8
65. Indeed, the element of risk that derives from leaving an area with a substantial team
following applies to any move, whether or not into the territory of another team.
66. Each of these cities was at one time the home of two major league baseball teams. In each
instance one of the city's teams relocated in another city.
67. See J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PuBLIC PoucY 108-10
(1981).
68. See, e.g., Bridge Corp. v. American Contract Bridge League, 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, 286 F. Supp.
146 (S.D. Ind. 1968).
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in his concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963), suggested evaluating territorial restrictions by considering
whether the arrangements are "more restrictive than necessary, or excessively anticompetitive."
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At the time the Coliseum commenced its suit, the NFL required a
unanimous vote to approve the transfer of a team to a site within the
territory of another team. 69 Such a structure appears fatally flawed.
The practical effect of a unanimity requirement is that each team has
veto power over any proposed move into its territory. This places completely and precisely in the wrong hands the decision whether to permit
entry into an area-in the hands of the entity most interested in restricting competition solely to gain monopolistic profits. One surely
would expect a rational owner to veto any "invasion" or, at least, to
extract substantial compensation for the reduction in his market
power. 0 While the NHL was considering the move of the Colorado
Rockies to New Jersey, for example, the principal owner of the New
York Islanders remarked frankly that "from the Islanders' own selfish
viewpoint, we have no interest in it [the Rockies] being there. Why
71
should we want to share a good thing if we don't have to?"

He also suggested that the Court explore whether less restrictive alternatives are available. Id. at
270-71 (Brennan, J.,concurring).
69. The Coliseum commenced its suit in September of 1978 after the Rams announced their
intention to move to Anaheim. The Coliseum initially argued that league rules enabled the Rams,
whose new home territory included Los Angeles, to frustrate its efforts to obtain another football
team. The rules were changed to the present three-quarters approval requirement shortly after the
suit was filed. See Granelli, supra note 1,at 1, col. 2.
In 1979, the district court, considering only the Coliseum's complaint, dismissed the suit with
leave to amend. The Coliseum failed to allege that there was a likelihood that members of the
league would not approve the move. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F.
Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The Coliseum later met the standing requirements and its motion for
a preliminary injunction was granted. However, the court of appeals reversed the order and remanded the case to the district court. 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal.), rev'do 634 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir. 1980).
70. Presumably, an incumbent team's owners will attempt to obtain an amount reflecting the
decrease in its future income attributable to the existence of another team in the territory. The
calculation necessarily will be imprecise.
71. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at BI I, col. 1. When the San Diego Clippers of the NBA
applied for permission to move to Los Angeles in 1982, however, the Los Angeles Lakers' owner
waived his rights to object to the move and insist on compensation. See Id., June 8, 1982, at C7,
col 1.Three possible reasons for his position appear plausible. First, he may have thought that the
move was not likely to be approved and, therefore, that he need not retain a veto over it. The fact
that later in the year the league moved to strip the San Diego owner of his franchise suggests that
the Lakers' owner may well have had reason to believe that the move would not be permitted.
Second, he may have believed that his team was so well entrenched that its position would not be
significantly affected by the Clippers' move. Third, at a time when antitrust suits are common, he
may have thought that his behavior would reduce the chances that he and the league would be
exposed to antitrust liability.
When the Clippers applied for permission to move, the league began an inquiry into several
relevant matters, including whether the team would be properly financed, whether the facilities in
which it intended to play were adequate, and whether the area could support two teams. But, in
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There is no reason to assume, however, that large metropolitan areas, such as New York-New Jersey and Los Angeles, cannot support
two professional football teams. 7 21 The presence of two teams in an area
provides a choice for consumers and all the benefits to fans incident to
the existence of alternatives. If the stability of the league is not
threatened by having two teams in the same territory, and if both
teams can operate profitably, then no restrictions on team location are
justified. The flaw in the NFL's unanimity scheme was not that it restricted moves to promote stability, but rather that it could be used to
prevent moves that did not endanger the viability of the league or existing teams. The veto power conferred by a unanimity requirement enables an owner to continually block relocations or new franchises solely
23
because the invasion would threaten his economic self-interests
Moreover, a unanimity rule may encourage owners to extract questionable "indemnification" payments from a team that wishes to move.7 '
light of the Raiders' case, the league was not sure whether it was free to consider these matters
and rule on the request. As a result, the league filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
court in San Diego, seeking a declaration of the scope of its authority under the antitrust laws.
See id., June 23, 1982, at A22, col. 6. The action never proceeded to a judgment, however, because in September 1982 the Clippers withdrew their request for permission to move. See td.. July
2, 1982, at A17, col. 4.
72. Indeed, during the trial, Commissioner Rozelle stated that the NFL would be better
served by keeping the Raiders in Oakland and adding an expansion team in Los Angeles. See Id..
Apr. 7, 1982, at A18, col. 4. But the placement of a new team in Los Angeles would undercut the
decision to keep the Raiders in Oakland to the extent that the decision was based on a judgment
that the Los Angeles area cannot support more than one team. Moreover, the declared objective
would be accomplished at the cost of keeping the Raiders in Oakland, where they do not want to
be. The option to permit the Raiders to move and to place a new team in Oakland was always
available.
73. In the language of the sport, an individual franchise should not be the sole referee of this
kind of call.
74. Under a unanimity rule, a team that thought it might be injured by a move might insist on
payment even though its defined territory would not be invaded. Indeed, with a unanimity rule,
any member might demand a payment in exchange for its vote. In the NBA and the NFL, the
"home territory" extends to a radius of 75 miles from the city's corporate limits. N.B.A. Co%.st. §
10(a); N.F.L. CoNsT. & By-LAws art. IV, § 4.1. In the NHL, a team's "home territory" includes
all areas within 50 miles from the city's corporate limits. Letter from Gilbert Stein, Vice President/General Counsel, National Hockey League, to Lewis Kurlantzick (Sept. 21, 1982).
A case in point may have occurred when the league gave the Colorado Rockies permission to
move to northern New Jersey after they agreed to make a substantial "indemnification" payment
to the Philadelphia Flyers. East Rutherford, New Jersey, the site of the Rockies' new arena, is
more than 50 miles from Philadelphia and thus beyond the Flyers' home territory. In all, the
Rockies agreed to pay indemnification fees totaling approximately S12.5 million to the New York
Rangers, New York Islanders, and the Flyers. See Mifflin, Rockies Are Sold and Moved to
Meadowlands N.Y. Times, May 28, 1982, at A17, col. 1. In response to the question why the
Flyers were paid, the NHL Vice President/General Counsel replied that the matter was confiden-
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Recognition of the undesirability and antitrust illegality of unanimity requirements is significant for several reasons. First, other
leagues continue to operate with similar rules. The NHL requires a
unanimous vote for approval of a transfer.7 5 The NBA requires only a
three-quarters vote,"8 but if the move is into the area of an existing
team, that franchise must also approve." Second, legislation that was
introduced in Congress in reaction to the Raiders' move apparently
78
would immunize such rules from antitrust scrutiny.
Shortly after the Coliseum filed its antitrust action against the
NFL in 1978, the league changed the approval requirement from unanimity to three-quarters. 79 Should this change save the NFL arrangement from antitrust violation? Al Davis charges that the change is
merely cosmetic; an individual owner who wants to prevent a move can
easily gather enough support to preclude a three-quarters vote of aptial. Letter from Gilbert Stein to Lewis Kurlantzick (Oct. 15, 1982). The Rockies also paid a
"transfer fee" of $10 million to the league. See Mifflin, Rockies Are Sold and Moved to
Meadowlands, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1982, at A17, col. I. This fee obviously exceeded the amount
needed to cover the administrative costs that the league would incur in adjusting to the change in
location. In response to the questions why the league was paid, where the money paid to the
league goes, and whether it is distributed among league members, Mr. Stein again stated that the
information was confidential. Letter from Gilbert Stein to Lewis Kurlantzick (Oct. 15, 1982).
There is good reason to believe, however, that the payment of the transfer fee reflected the fact
that the grant of permission to move deprived the league of the opportunity to place an expansion
franchise in New Jersey.
75. Letter from Gilbert Stein, Vice President/General Counsel, National Hockey League, to
Lewis Kurlantzick (Sept. 21, 1982). The NHL Constitution, like the NFL's, does not set forth
any criteria or standards for making the decision to approve or disapprove the relocation of a
franchise.
76. N.B.A. CONST. § 7.
77. N.B.A. CONST. § 9.
78. See The Professional Sports Stabilization Act of 1982, H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Scss.,
§ 2(l)(a), 128 CONG. REc. H2598 (daily ed. May 21, 1982)(not unlawful under the antitrust
laws for a professional league and its members "to enforce rules requiring approval by the membership of the league for any relocation of a member club").
79. The affirmative vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs is necessary to approve
the transfer of an existing franchise or the establishment of a new one. N.F.L. CONST. & ByLAWS, art. Ill, § 3.1(b) (1970, amended 1982); art. IV, § 4.3 (1970, amended 1982). This amendment, according to the NFL, also means that no indemnity is payable as a matter of right to a
team into whose territory another club is authorized to move. As a result, the NFL rules on
movement are somewhat less restrictive than those in the NHL and NBA. Because the NHL
requires unanimity, an accommodation must be reached with the incumbent team in the area. The
NBA requires only a three-quarters vote, but if there is an incumbent team, then its approval
must be secured by the moving team. The NFL now requires a three-quarters vote and makes no
formal provision for compensation to an incumbent team. The principal operative significance of
the NFL's "home territory" concept now lies in defining the area in which home games that are
not sold out cannot be televised.
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proval. This is particularly true, it is claimed, when a "maverick" such
as Davis wishes to make the move. Indeed, in other sports, transfer
rules have been abused when applied to unpopular owners. In 1953, for
example, baseball's American League voted twice not to permit Bill
Veeck, the owner of the St. Louis Browns, to move his team to Baltimore. After the second refusal, Veeck sold the team. Two days later,
the league voted unanimously to permit the new owner to make the
80
move.
In any case, the new scheme retains a number of troublesome features, among which are the absence of any explicit criteria for approval
or disapproval of a plan to move and the lack of procedural safeguards
to ensure that an owner can present his case fully and have it judged
fairly. In addition, the restrictive rule is unlimited in duration. Movement into a team's territory is restricted long after that team has had a
chance to recoup its start-up costs. Particularly troubling is the totally
discretionary nature of the process. Every proposed move must be voted
on by all the owners without criteria to guide the decision or standards
by which the decision can be evaluated. Moreover, the arrangement
lacks procedural provisions aimed at insuring that the league does not
act arbitrarily or impose restraints that exceed the scope of its need to
self-regulate. While the interdependence of league members and the
resulting need for an inquiry when an owner wishes to move a
franchise-as well as when a franchise is sought-must be recognized,
the exercise of this discretion in an anticompetitive fashion and its use
to discipline unpopular league members, like Davis, must also be
considered.
In sum, the NFL's present three-quarters approval rule should be
deemed an antitrust violation. But the dilemma is apparent. While
some requirement of approval appears reasonable, the potential for
abuse is clear. And there is little in the NFL territorial restrictions,
80. Similarly, in 1977, Ted Turner, the flamboyant owner of the Atlanta Braves, was barred
from having any role in the operation of the team for a full year. He was found to have communicated with Gary Matthews, who was to become a free agent, before the time at which he was
permitted to negotiate with Matthews. See Chass, Kuhn Suspends Turner. Braves' Owner. for
Year in Matthews Case. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1977, at A29, col. 2. One cannot help but suspect
that the sanction imposed on Turner was punitive and "disciplinary" because it appears to be
wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the offense.
In addition, a discriminatory application of league procedures occurred with the sale of the
Chicago Bulls of the NBA. The owner of the Chicago Stadium, who was seeking to buy the team,
used his economic power and friendship with several NBA owners to effect a denial of the transfer
of the franchise to a rival bidder. See Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,378
(N.D. I11.Oct. 28, 1981).
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transfer rules, and decisional procedures that give much assurance that
this potential will be contained.
V.

PROPOSAL

The challenge is to design a scheme that permits some regulation
of team location when genuine league interests are involved without
running afoul of antitrust law. The concern about abuse of league discretion might be lessened if the league adopted rules designed to protect only its legitimate interests, including guidelines, and provided that
the rules could be applied in some situations without requiring all the
owners to vote. Thus, the question whether an area can support a team,
or two teams, for example, might be decided in part with a populationbased rule or rule of thumb such as that employed by Major League
Baseball. Baseball's governing rules enable a league to prevent the
other league from moving a team into a city already occupied by one of
its teams only if the city has a population of less than 2.4 million.8 1
And legislation introduced in 1979 to prohibit the grant or exercise of
exclusive rights in a geographical area included an exception where the
home territory contains less than two million residents. 82 Similarly, the
NFL might articulate a set of presumptions or a list of factors, including, for example, population, income statistics, and the number of college teams in the area, to be considered when deciding whether to permit moves. Such devices would help an antitrust court to structure its
inquiry and would lessen the chance of an antitrust violation by reducing the potential for abuse of discretion.
The NFL admittedly has a legitimate interest in the development
of fan loyalty, a goal that is furthered by franchise continuity. 8 3 But
81. Major League Rule I (c).
82. Sports Antitrust Reform Act, H.R. 2129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNe. Rac. H591-92
(daily ed. Feb. 13, 1979). This bill also would have repealed baseball's antitrust exemption. The
congressional swings are worth noting. The 1979 bill was designed to outlaw exclusive rights in
geographical areas. In contrast, the legislation introduced in 1982, in reaction to the Raiders' case,
is designed to strengthen transfer restrictions.
83. What attention should be given to fan support of a team over a period of time? Does
sustained loyalty create some kind of an obligation to keep the team in place? The fans of the
Raiders are understandably upset that Al Davis has moved the team to Los Angeles. But, as any
Brooklyn Dodger fan knows, the law does not endow consumers with any right to a sufficient
supply of a particular product. Arguments that "fairness" to loyal fans requires some restrictions
on team movement do not put forth a claim that has traditionally been within the protection of
the antitrust laws. The fan whose team moves to another city is no different from the consumer
whose favorite cereal is taken off the shelf. The argument can be made that fans at the new site
have as strong a claim to the team as its present fans. Moreover, if the new area offers greater
potential for fan support, free-market principles dictate that the interests of the new fans should
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the league can guard against the potential problem of frequent team
turnover with an objective rule or set of rules, for example, that require
its teams to stay in place for a minimum number of years. The arrangement may be made more flexible, if necessary, by allowing a team
to move prior to the expiration of the minimum period if it can demonstrate special circumstances such as poor attendance, losses over a period of years; inadequate facilities, or breach of its lease. In practice,
moves or attempts to move by sports franchises have been relatively
rare in recent years. And it is difficult to argue that franchise relocation has produced serious permanent harm in any professional sport.
The fact is that the NFL and other professional sports leagues
can, if they wish, devise alternative arrangements that will serve legitimate league objectives and also, by limiting the opportunity for arbitrary application of restraints, will be much less vulnerable to antitrust
challenge. Consider, for instance, a scheme whereby the league: 1)
states that its objective, among other concerns, is to prevent moves that
would weaken an incumbent team and thereby weaken the league; 2)
sets forth a policy stating that such a move will be permitted if it appears that two teams can be viable in the particular area and the incumbent team will not be seriously undercut by the move; 3) sets forth
objective criteria consistent with the league objective and policy that
will be looked to in deciding whether a move should be permitted; and
4) places the decision in the hands of a separate entity with no direct
financial stake in the decision-the Commissioner or, better still, a disinterested arbitrator-so as to insulate it from the owners' short-term
interest in restricting competition. Such a scheme would be responsive
to league needs, but contrasts notably with a unanimity or threeprevail. Resources must be free to move to areas where there is greatest demand. Indeed, the

policy of the antitrust laws--commitment to protection of the competitive process rather than any
particular competitor-is based, in part, on the premise that if an area can support a new business
or team, someone will move a business or team to that area.
It should not be concluded, however, that there are in fact no legal or extralegal forces in
operation that are of aid to loyal fans. The league does have a legitimate interest in placing some
restrictions on team turnover. And sustained fan support reduces the likelihood that a team will
relocate. If a team has a proven following in its present location, a prudent owner will be quite
hesitant to move the team. Moreover, if a move does occur, the existence of proven fan support
will make the city an attractive candidate for another franchise. In fact, the history of professional
baseball indicates that there is more than theoretical support for the argument that resources will
move to meet demand. Several cities have been "deserted" and subsequently "resettled" by baseball teams. In addition, in cities where stadia are publicly owned or operated, lease provisions
provide an additional barrier to team movement. Finally, the Raiders' experience draws attention
to the possible use of the power of eminent domain to restrain team movement. See note 6 supra.
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quarters rule and the process by which it is applied. 8'
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The antitrust suit filed by the Coliseum and the Raiders focuses
attention on the complex economic nature of a sports league. Resolution of the Raiders' claim may well force dramatic changes in the organization and operation of sports leagues. Professional sports leagues
do not fit well with standard models of industrial organization, and application of antitrust law to leagues must be tailored to the unique kind
of economic enterprise they constitute. Practices that would clearly be
violative of the antitrust laws in other industries may be lawful in the
sports context, and offered justifications, such as financial stability, that
would be given little credence elsewhere, may be valid here.
The distinctive character of a sports league, however, does not justify a sweeping exemption from antitrust scrutiny. Courts must judge
whether particular practices are essential to the league's continued success. In determining legality, the touchstone for a court should be
whether the contested practice is essential for organiied competition. In
addition, it may be helpful in measuring legality to ask, first, whether
the arrangement flows from an interest in interbrand competition and,
second, whether the practice appears to be rooted principally in the
profit-maximization interests of the individual owners as competitors or
in the needs of the league as an organized entity, including its longrange promotion of the game. Moreover, courts must always consider
whether a less restrictive arrangement could adequately protect league
interests.
In conclusion, while both the need for flexibility in the application
of the antitrust laws to professional sports and the difficulty of evaluating the reasonableness of particular arrangements must be acknowledged, the NFL restrictions challenged by the Raiders should be
deemed a violation of section one of the Sherman Act. But a less restrictive alternative can be justified.

84. It should be reiterated that the discussion of geographical and transfer restrictions has
implications for rules governing the admission of new teams as well. Thus, some limit on teams'
discretion with respect to the decision whether to admit new teams and an articulation of the
factors to be considered is desirable.

